Life and Work Franz Brentano was born on January 16, in Marienberg am Rhein, Germany, a descendent of a strongly religious German-Italian family of intellectuals his uncle Clemens Brentano and his aunt Bettina von Arnim were among the most important writers of German Romanticism and his brother Lujo Brentano became a leading expert in social economics. Already at high school he became acquainted with Scholasticism; at university he studied Aristotle with Trendelenburg in Berlin, and read Comte as well as the British Empiricists mainly John Stuart Millall of whom had a great influence on his work. Brentano received his Ph. After graduation Brentano prepared to take his vows; he was ordained a Catholic priest in
Moore is famous for claiming in Principia Ethica that the good cannot be defined. Robert Pirsig, in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, says something similar but then later has to admit that he says quite a bit about what the good "Quality" is. Nevertheless, what he says about the good is less a definition than a description of its reality: That approach to the good, however, goes all the way back to Plato.
In the Republic Plato distinguishes two levels of reality, the World of Becoming transient and imperfectwhich we see, and the World of Being eternal and unchangingwhich we don't see.
Although Plato deliberately avoids giving a definition, he says that the good is to the world of Being what the sun is to the visible world -- the source of all knowledge and even existence.
Several centuries after Plato, the Neoplatonists said that the good is simply Being itself or beyond Being and the source of all existence. The Neoplatonists used Plato's metaphor of the sun, claiming that all existence radiates from the good the way light radiates from the sun -- and that evil is the outer darkness of non-existence.
In modern philosophy, Immanuel Kant did not speculate about the relation of value to being, but he did distinguish two levels of reality as Plato did: Kant thought that all our knowledge was about phenomena, except for moral knowledge, which was based on things-in-themselves.
Kant didn't think we could know how that worked, but, rather like Humehe took it as a given. This all certainly makes it sound like the word "good" is hard to define, but that is actually wrong if what we mean by good is the common sense of an instrumental good.
An instrumental good is something that is good for something, as a light bulb is good for providing light. In that sense, "good" can be exhaustively defined: Saying that a light bulb is good for providing light is the same as to say that the purpose of a light bulb is to provide light and, perhaps, it accomplishes that purpose to a greater extent than other things, like candles, that provide light.
Many ordinary definitions of "good" suffer from the difficulty of a circular definition by merely replacing "good" with a equivalent value term, like "value" itself, or "beneficent," which comes from the Latin word for "good," or "moral order," all of which simply throw us back to the larger question about the nature of value, which is what our question about the good was really about in the first place.
The idea of purpose adds a completely different dimension to the question about the good. Note that there are two possible instrumental judgments about light bulbs: A good hammer does what a hammer is supposed to do, drive nails.
Even driving nails "well" can be given a purposive definition: A good car does what a car is intended to do -- get you where you want to go reliably and with some degree of comfort. If these things are not adequate to their purpose, we say that there is something "wrong" with them. If what is wrong can be set right, then they can continue being good examples of their kind.
If what is wrong cannot be set right, then they become bad examples of their kind, a bad hammer or a bad car. Instrumental goods do not create the greatest difficulties with defining the good.
There are other goods that are good in themselves.
They are not good for anything. These are the ultimate goals or ends of mere instrumental goods, which otherwise would generate a infinite regress of ends.
They are intrinsic, rather than instrumental, goods; and intrinsic goods are what seem to resist definition. Intrinsic goods still maintain an obvious relation to purposes, since, as Aristotle puts it, "the good is that at which all things aim.
The good is not good because things aim at it.Brentano's clearest exposition of his view on consciousness is in the second half of Chapter 2, and the whole of Chapter 3, of Book II of Brentano Relevant developments appear from his lecture notes of , published posthumously as Brentano / The concept of intentionality and the philosophy of time as the study of an internal time consciousness were also ideas central to Husserlian phenomenology that were developed by Brentano.
Brentano, however, limited the sphere of consciousness to what is given to the self through introspection. The theory of Gestalt therapy is itself a new Gestalt, though it does not contain many new thoughts. What its founders, Fritz and Laura Perls and Paul Goodman, .
Phenomenology. In its central use, the term "phenomenology" names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of "phenomenology" common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them.
Phenomenology: Phenomenology, a philosophical movement originating in the 20th century, the primary objective of which is the direct investigation and description of phenomena as consciously experienced, without theories about their causal explanation and as free as possible from unexamined preconceptions and.
A Miniature Library of Philosophy. tracing the development of ideas on the relation between consciousness and matter through the words of philosophers over years:— Overview French Materialism & Communism, Marx, ; The Task of the Historian of Philosophy, Hegel, ; History of Philosophy, Hegel » from Galileo to Feuerbach «.